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Abstract
In October, 2015 Kaspersky released an analysis of
the bootkit “HDRoot”. Their analysis highlighted
mistakes in the bootkit, which made it ineffective at
performing its task. Upon attempts to replicate that
analysis however, it appears that these conclusions
were in error and the bootkit works with any Windows
version in the last 16 years. HDRoot represents a
serious commitment in time and effort to develop, and
an in-depth analysis reveals the work of a significantly
capable threat actor. The sample analyzed here dates to
2013, and is the same sample Kasperky reports to have
analyzed in their post. However, all evidence points to
Kaspersky performing analysis with a 2006 sample,
likely the reason for their conclusions. Additionally,
mistakes made in reporting the capability of offensive
software, provided without means to verify, hurt the
security industry by misleading practitioners and
limiting their ability for informed decision making.

1. Introduction
Kaspersky attributes the HDRoot malware to the
WINNTI group, a threat actor that they connect to
Chinese origins [1]. This analysis looks at a dropper for
HDRoot and the installed bootkit code, and does not
attempt attribution or analyze any other samples linked
to HDRoot. The dropper is capable of installing any PE
executable as the payload for the bootkit, but does not
come bundled with any default payloads. As such, this
report offers no insight into the various payloads used
by the authors in practice. For information on the other
malware associated with the WINNTI group, see Trend
Micro or Kaspersky’s reports on the group [2] [1]. This
analysis does, however, offer a very in-depth look into
the technical workings of the HDRoot bootkit and its
components.
Also addressed in this work are a number of
technical inaccuracies and misrepresentations in
Kaspersky’s SecureList post of October 2015, “I am
HDRoot! Part 1,” which was the only research on this
sample to be published prior to this paper [4].
Kaspersky’s research was very helpful getting started,
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but it soon became apparent that their analysis was not
actually performed using the sample identified by MD5
in the article and thus could not be relied upon. This is
believed to be the reason for many of their criticisms of
HDRoot, which they call, “not what you expect from
such a serious APT actor.” The sample analyzed here is
not free of criticisms, but all of the problems addressed
by Kaspersky appear to have been fixed in the sample
their post lists the signature of. Other faults and
weaknesses, however, are addressed.

1.1. Sample
MD5 Hash:
2c85404fe7d1891fd41fcee4c92ad305

SHA1 Hash:
4c3171b48d600e6337f1495142c43172d3b01770

Original Name:
Product Version:
Time Stamp:
Produce Name:

net.exe
6.1.7600.16385
2012/08/06 13:12:39 UTC
Microsoft Windows Operating
System
Retrieved from malwr [3].

2. Overview of Architecture
The malware examined here can be broken into
several stages. The 64-bit dropper, which was signed
with a stolen certificate that has since been revoked, is
the first component that is executed. The dropper installs
the bootkit to the hard drive along with a backdoor
executable to be run on subsequent boots. The backdoor
is supplied as a command line parameter to the dropper
and can be any Win32 or Win64 executable.
Upon boot, the computer will execute the
maliciously installed MBR, which loads a subsequent
component that is named here as the “verifier”. It is a
single sector block that verifies that the rest of the
bootkit and the backdoor are intact before running them.
The bulk of the bootkit’s work is done by the next
component, rkImage. The name rkImage actually comes
from the interface of the dropper, which explicitly refers
to it when installing the bootkit. rkImage works by
manually reading the file system from the disk in order
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to write the backdoor (the generic term used to refer to
the payload) into the filesystem and redirect a Windows
system service to launch the backdoor.
When rkImage is finished it transfers execution back
to the original, non-infected MBR and allows Windows
to boot normally. The booting system will run the
backdoor instead of the replaced system service, but will
then restore and start the legitimate service after the
backdoor has ran, hiding the fact it was ever replaced.

written for certain versions of VMProtect, but these are
generally found in forum posts and are not well
maintained. This is most likely the reason Kaspersky did
the bulk of their analysis with a different sample that
was almost, but not quite, functionally the same. Not
wanting to spend time tackling VMProtect, a number of
other techniques were used to analyze artifacts instead.

3. Dropper
The dropper is designed to disguise itself as the
Windows system utility net.exe. The properties on the
executable attempt to mirror the settings found on a
Windows 7 version of the utility, reporting it to be a
Microsoft program. When run without parameters,
HDRoot shows the options menu as if it were net.exe.
That is where the similarities end, however.
The dropper executable, while masquerading as the
Microsoft net command, has been signed with a digital
certificate belonging to Guangzhou YuanLuo
Technology Co, Ltd, a firm based in the city of
Guangzhou, China who had their signing certificate
stolen by the WINNTI group. The certificate has since
been revoked, and, if the signing time and compilation
dates on the executable are to be believed, it was signed
in 2013 almost a year after this version was initially
compiled.
Figure 2. Graph overview of VMProtect's
emulator.

Figure 1. Dropper disguising itself as net.exe

3.1. VMProtect
A notable hindrance to reversing the dropper is that
it was packed using VMProtect. Unlike most packers,
which decompress and then jump to the original
executable code, VMProtect converts the x86 opcodes
into an automatically generated language of bytecodes
to be interpreted in its own emulator. Attempting to
statically analyze the sample would prove an arduous
task. Instead of x86 instructions, the main contents of
the program exist in the language of the automatically
generated emulator, and the only intelligible
instructions left are for interpreting these opcodes.
There have been a few unpacking plugins for Ollydbg

When the dropper obscured with VMProtect is run
with any of the legitimate net command parameters or
with unrecognized parameters, no output is given. The
only commands that provide output are the valid
HDRoot commands programmed by the authors.
Kaspersky, by analyzing an older sample from 2006,
was able to get a “help” output, rather than the “net”
output, which contained a list of commands for that
version. This was not present in the 2013 sample
analyzed here, unfortunately, and the VMProtect
obfuscation makes finding a command list through
normal reverse engineering means prohibitive. Most of
the previous commands still worked on the newer
sample, and all of the commands were five or less
characters in length. Even short words like install were
abbreviated to “inst”, rather than left intact.
Since the Kaspersky command listing was half a
decade older than this sample, and some of the
commands from their listing were no longer present, a
simple, and very slow, fuzzer was written to attempt to
check all possible commands of five or less characters.
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Given the length of the other commands and that input
appears to be case insensitive, this appears to be a
reasonable approach. The code for the fuzzer can be
found in the supplemental files on the author’s website.
Screenshots for each command can be found there as
well. No additional commands to the ones Kaspersky
detailed were found by the fuzzer and Table 1 contains
the complete list of known commands.
Table 1. HDRoot dropper commands
Command
check
clean
inst <Backdoor>
info <Backdoor>

Description
Checks for the presence of the
bootkit and the integrity if
present.
Removes the bootkit.
Installs the bootkit
Shows information about the
checksums and requirements
for an executable if it was
installed as the backdoor.

3.2. DEBUGFILE.sys – A signed kernel driver
At the time the dropper installs the bootkit, no
changes to the filesystem or the registry are seen
between snapshots taken before and after. The approach
used was to run the dropper in a continuous loop in a
virtual machine, suspending the VM, and analyzing the
resulting memory image. Performing memory capture
from outside the VM appeared to be the best option
because there were a number of anti-debugging
techniques employed along with the anti-disassembly.
Using Volatility, two more PE files were discovered that
the dropper extracted inside the process, but none of the
four clear text resources Kaspersky claimed to have
extracted from a memory dump, providing further proof
that they did their analysis on a different sample than is
listed in their blog post. The two PE files found were
kernel drivers, one 32-bit and one 64-bit. The 64-bit
driver is signed, as is required by 64-bit versions of
Windows, using yet another stolen certificate, while the
32-bit driver is not signed. This certificate belongs to a
South Korean video game company, Neowiz. The

certificate, unlike the one for the dropper, has yet to be
revoked.
The use of the kernel drivers is fairly
straightforward. Without kernel access there is no way
for malware to write directly to the physical disk as there
are no Windows API calls available to user land
processes for doing so. The dropper writes out the
appropriate driver to the file DEBUGFILE.sys in
C:\Windows\system32\Drivers, and then creates a
service for it. This shows up in the memory image as a
registry handle to HKEY Local Machine with the path
System\ControlSet001\services\DEBUGFILE.
The
service runs and the driver \Driver\DEBUGFILE is
created. DEBUGFILE.sys is also deleted from the disk.
The driver is used by the dropper to proxy its direct
access to the physical disk. A number of things are done
in this process. The original MBR is backed up and then
overwritten by the new bootkit MBR, and then weakly
encrypted components are written to disk. Near the
beginning of the disk is the component I’ve named the
verifier, followed by two identical copies of the original
MBR. In another section of the disk is the main
component of the bootkit, rkImage, followed by the
backdoor that was installed.
One peculiar thing the malware does is install a
second copy of the rkImage and backdoor files. This
copy is encrypted identically to the first, and positioned
such that it ends exactly 2063 sectors from the end of
the drive. What makes this strange is that nothing in the
bootkit will ever transfer execution to the second copy,
and that the second copy is only installed if the drive has
at least 30% free space. Kaspersky erroneously
identified this behavior as only installing if the disk has
greater than 30% free space, rather than installing a
redundant copy of itself. As can be seen in a Windows
7 screenshot from the supplemental files, the bootkit is
perfectly capable of installing with less than 30% free
space. The only guess the authors make as to the purpose
of this second copy is for the indented backdoor to be
able to identify if one of the copies has been modified
after it starts. The dropper will also detect a modified
copy with the “check” command.

Figure 3. Physical disk layout written by DEBUGFILE.sys
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Figure 5. Infected MBR code to
load, decrypt verifier

Figure 4. Address layout of
memory loaded before rkImage

4. MBR
For all x86 systems not running UEFI, the boot
process starts with the BIOS loading the Master Boot
Record into memory and jumping to it. By convention,
the BIOS loads the MBR to the physical memory
address of 0x7C00. Another convention that many
MBRs follow is to copy themselves, a single 0x200
sized sector, to the address 0x600 and then transfer
execution to this location. The HDRoot bootkit is no
exception. This is partly because the only code it
actually changes in the original MBR is the jump
address and the code jumped to. Most of the original
MBR and partition table information is intact.
A normal MBR would look at the partition table to
find the partition with the boot flag set, and then load the
volume boot sector of that partition and transfer
execution. HDRoot’s MBR works similarly by calling
interrupt 13 to read two sectors from disk into memory
at the address 0x7A00 (through 0x7DFF). These are the
verifier and the original MBR, which now has been
loaded into the location where the MBR would have
originally loaded on a non-infected system. The bootkit
does not store these on disk in clear text, however. They
are written to disk having been XOR’d with the byte
value 0x76. The supplemental files have a C utility that
can be used to decrypt the values. A function at offset
MBR+0x88 performs these read and decrypt operations,
copies the partition table from the infected MBR to the

original (incase the victim has changed any partitions
since the bootkit was installed), and then transfers
execution to the verifier.

5. Verifier
The job of the verifier is to make sure that the bootkit
is intact and that a specific set of criteria are met before
allowing the bootkit to run. If any of these criteria fail
the verifier will transfer the boot process to the original
MBR, now at 0x7C00, without the bootkit executing.
This mechanism helps prevent bricking the victim
machine in the event that one or more of the bootkit
sectors are corrupted or overwritten.
The first criteria in the verifier process is a check for
whether the alt key is pressed on the keyboard. If the alt
key is pressed, the bootkit launch will be aborted. The
verifier then checks for a value at 0x7A08 (+0x8 from
the verifier start address). If the value is null, the startup
is aborted. This value is the drive identifier of where
rkImage and the backdoor are stored. This was 0x80 in
all the systems tested, which indicates drive 0. The
dropper sets this value, and the subsequent bytes, before
writing them to disk. This ensures that the bootkit was
properly setup during install, and allows for the bootkit
to be stored on a separate disk from the system disk.
Table 2 shows a breakdown of the rkImage information
stored in the verifier.
The third and final check done by the verifier is
computing a CRC16 value on the obfuscated contents of
rkImage and the backdoor (still only encrypted with an
XOR 0x76). It compares the results to the saved CRC,
and if they do not match it aborts. Otherwise it reads the
entire rkImage, but not the backdoor, to 0x10000, and
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then decrypts both. The last step is to copy the size and
location information to the start of rkImage, so it can
locate the backdoor for installing.
Table 2. rkImage location information in verifier
Address
0x7A02
0x7A04
0x7A06
0x7A08
0x7A09
0x7A0D
…

Contents
0x55AA, not used, signals start of
rkImage location data.
CRC16 value for rkImage+Backdoor.
Sector count for rkImage+Backdoor.
Drive number
Sector where rkImage+Backdoor starts.
Next 0x55AA value, if present
…

6. rkImage
A significant component to reverse engineering the
functionality of this bootkit was becoming familiar with
the mechanics of low-level, pre-OS x86. For anyone
looking to get into this the Intermediate Intel x86 videos
on OpenSecurityTraining.info are highly recommended
[5]. Even just following the transition from the verifier
to rkImage requires some understanding of these
mechanics, as the processor is still in 16-bit real mode
at this time and a far jump is being performed, crossing
a barrier between segments. This seems like a trivial
thing until you find out that GDB, even operating in
8086 mode remotely debugging the bootkit running in
QEMU, has absolutely zero understanding of segment
addressing and completely falls apart trying to set
breakpoints at any address higher than 0xFFFF. In
retrospect Bochs might have been a better choice for this
over QEMU, but not being familiar with it either the
author struggled through with QEMU, performing most
of the analysis indirectly, either statically or
dynamically through the clues left behind by the
bootkit’s actions.
The first task rkImage sets itself to, like any sane
bootloader, is to transfer itself from real mode to
protected mode and then to 32-bit mode. In order to
enable protected mode, the Global Descriptor Table
must be setup and loaded. This is actually fairly
unimportant to the operation of the malware but
understanding it helped with getting the disassembly
properly setup in IDA Pro to assist with the process. The
details regarding and the contents of the segment
descriptors are outside of the scope of this paper, but for
anyone looking to make an analysis of them, the clearest
explanations and diagrams were found in the AMD
Architecture Programmer’s Manual, Vol 2., for system
programming [6]. Something that caused confusion was
that most diagrams detailing the structure of segment

descriptors (the entries in the Global Descriptor Table)
are for the descriptors in 64-bit mode, since the 32-bit
descriptors, called legacy segment descriptors in
AMD’s documentation, have a different structure. The
work done reassembling the GDT can be seen in the
rkImage IDB file in the supplemental files.
Once setup in a 32-bit environment, rkImage
decrypts two sections in itself, the first containing a 32bit DLL, and the second containing a 64-bit DLL. These
are used to launch the backdoor from a Windows system
service upon Windows booting. Each DLL has a 4-byte
XOR key. The data is stored in rkImage in the format:
4-byte key, 4-byte length, encrypted PE file contents.
The 32-bit DLL and its data are located at an offset of
0x4BE0 and the 64-bit values are at 0x6DE8,
immediately after the previous DLL. These DLLs as
packaged contain the registry path to the LanmanServer
service DLL. The version of rkImage in this sample,
installed by the 64-bit dropper, overwrites the
LanmanServer information with the paths and values for
the Schedule service. This allows for changing the target
service without the need to recompile the DLLs
embedded in rkImage. Kaspersky's observations that
there are a number of different services that different
samples have targeted supports this conclusion.
The backdoor executable is then loaded into memory
and decrypted with the 0x76 XOR operation. At the end
of this preparation work of loading, decrypting, and
copying data, rkImage calls a function that is marked as
DETERMINE_VERSION_NT_32_64_BIT in the
supplemental disassembly. This is the function that
determines what Windows version is installed, what
malicious DLL to use, and where to install it. Since the
malware will attempt to boot in any Windows version
from Windows 2000 to Windows 10, there is a
considerable nest of switch and if statements happening
here. It first checks whether there is a “\winnt” directory,
which is present in Windows 2000, and then if "\winnt"
is not found it will subsequently check in
“\windows\system32\kernel32.dll”. The check for
kernel32.dll in system32 prevents the bootkit from
continuing install on Windows 98 and lower systems, as
kernel32.dll was stored in the system directory rather
than system32 before this point. If kernel32.dll is found
it will check for “\users” and “\documents and settings”
to determine if it is XP/2003, or Vista or newer. If it is
not able to locate any of these, it falls out of the switch
statement and no bootkit is installed.
If the directory selected was not “\winnt”, it will
check for “\windows\syswow64” and set a variable
indicating if the system is 64-bit. This is used later when
choosing which DLL to install (which means it is even
64-bit Windows XP / Server 2003 compatible). Then for
each of the three operating system categories it will
write the backdoor to %TEMP%\Explorer.exe
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Table 3. Service DLL Paths by OS, in order attempted
Windows Version

Path

Windows 2000

\winnt\help\access.hlp

Windows 2000

\winnt\system\OLESVR.DLL

Windows XP or 2003

\windows\twain.dll

Windows XP or 2003

\windows\system\OLESVR.DLL

Windows Vista/2008 & Newer

\windows\syswow64\C_932.NLS

Windows Vista/2008 & Newer

\windows\system\OLESVR.DLL

Windows Vista/2008 & Newer

\windows\syswow64\kmddsp.tsp

Windows Vista/2008 & Newer

\windows\syswow64\Irclass.dll

(wherever %TEMP% is located for that version of
Windows), and iterate through a list of files. If the file is
present it will copy the appropriate DLL into the
beginning of the file, overwriting the contents already
there. The files to be overwritten in question are
shown in Table 3, and appear to be carefully selected to
cause the least potential problems, with all but one of

them being for different architectures than the running
host.
Windows 2000 will attempt to first overwrite the
access.hlp file, which, if anyone has not already disabled
the help popups, may cause errors. Similarly, the 16-bit
OLESVR.DLL file is overwritten if access.hlp does not
exist. This will only cause issues if it is used by a 16-bit

Figure 6. Diagram showing the out-of-OS boot process
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application, as 32-bit applications will be using the
system32\OLESVR32.DLL file. Windows XP will
attempt to overwrite the 16-bit version of the twain.dll
library for scanners (even using old scanners,
twain32.dll should be used), and then the 16-bit
OLESVR.DLL if the twain.dll is not found.
In 64-bit Windows Vista and newer systems, the
default target is C_932.NLS, which is a 32-bit National
Language Support file for the Japanese language [7].
This assumes that authors did not plan on infecting
targets running 32-bit applications in Japanese, as this
would cause issues. The only file that will be tried for
32-bit Windows Vista and newer is the same 16-bit
OLESVR.DLL. This will only cause issues for
applications run in 16-bit compatibility/emulation
mode, as they are not natively supported in Vista and
newer, and is therefore unlikely to affect most targets.
The other two potential target files, which are also
unlikely to be used, are both 16-bit DLLs found in the
syswow64 (32-bit compatibility) directory. They are
actually only labeled as compatible with Windows
Server 2003 and earlier operating systems on MSDN,
but are for some reason still included in the syswow64
directory. Kmddsp.tsp is a “kernel mode device driver”
for “telephony service provider” network drivers, and
IRClass.dll is an Infrared Class Coinstaller [8]. Neither
should ever be used on a 64-bit system and therefore
won’t cause any issues if overwritten.

Once the DLL has been written to the appropriate
file, the registry is patched to overwrite the Schedule
service’s DLL path with the path to the overwritten file.
This should be approximately:
HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\Schedul
e\Parameters\ServiceDLL.
rkImage will then return to 16-bit real mode,
handing execution back to the original MBR at 0x7C00,
allowing the boot process to continue and Windows to
load. It is worth noting that since Windows NT also used
the C:\WINNT directory, it will match the first section
of the bootkit which chooses the files to write the DLL
into. However, since Windows did not introduce the
svchost.exe process until Windows 2000, services did
not have a Parameters sub-key or a ServiceDLL value
in Windows NT. As such, if installed on Windows NT
the bootkit wouldn't be able to locate the registry key for
editing, and would fail out of the installation process.
Additionally, it is likely that 32-bit versions of the
dropper would not allow the install to a Windows 2000
system.

7. Schedule Service DLL
The final component of the bootkit, responsible for
running the backdoor within Windows, is the DLL that
replaced the Schedule service. The bootkit did not
change the rest of the registry key, so it will be loaded

Figure 7. Flow of the malicious Schedule service
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into a svchost.exe executable. The Schedule service is
part of the NetworkService group, so the DLL will be
loaded into the svchost.exe containing the other services
for the group, and a new thread will be spawned to run
the ServiceMain for that DLL. Additionally, as happens
every time a DLL is loaded, the DLL’s entry point
(DLLMain, in this case) is called by the Windows loader
in another thread.
The HDRoot authors chose to use the DLLMain
function to start the backdoor process and ServiceMain
to revert the service registry entry back to the original
path. The DLLMain thread creates another thread
running the function that is identified in the disassembly
as SpawnBackdoorThread. That thread creates a process
running the backdoor, which rkImage saved to
%TEMP%\Explorer.exe. It then sets a global variable in
the DLL to signal that it successfully launched the
backdoor, and suspends itself before continuing.
Simultaneously the ServiceMain thread reverts the
registry, and waits for the backdoor to start, sleeping and
periodically checking for the flag to be set. After the flag
is set it resumes the SpawnBackdoor thread, and then
exits. In turn, the SpawnBackdoor thread unloads the
DLL from memory and then exits itself.
This has the effect of both threads exiting and the
DLL unloading at almost the exact same time,
guaranteeing that the service manager will have to
restart the service, causing the legitimate service DLL
to be loaded and run from the patched registry entry. In
all tests of this sample, not once did the real Windows
service ever fail to start after running the bootkit. This is
completely contrary to Kaspersky’s claim that the
bootkit breaks the service and that all the victims must
just not have cared or noticed that the service failed to
start.

8. Conclusions
The analysis of the HDRoot malware shows this
sample to have a sophisticated and functional
implementation. As is problematic and common with
much work in the malware analysis field, Kaspersky’s
published findings were released without enough detail
to verify. Additionally, no work was done to verify their
findings prior to this analysis. The discrepancies
between the conclusions in their report and the technical
findings in this analysis leads the author to the
conclusion than that they did their entire analysis with
and presented research on a ten-year-old sample, but
provided the signature indicators for the 2012 sample
that had been in modern use. It also shows that the
authors, who have been designated as the WINNTI
group, have been around for a significant period of time,

dating back to at least 2006 if the timestamps on
Kaspersky’s sample are to be believed.
The one stage of the attack in which the bootkit did
not make good use of hiding techniques was in covering
its tracks for the service and backdoor executables. Both
the modified file hosting the DLL (in most tests
C:\Windows\syswow64\C_932.NLS) and the backdoor
in %TEMP%\Explorer.exe were left intact on the file
system. However, it is likely that a sophisticated
backdoor run by the bootkit would know to remove
these two pieces of evidence after starting itself, and it
may just have been a choice of segregation of duties
made by the authors.
Another criticism that can be made is the extremely
weak use of encryption. The XOR cipher is little more
than obfuscation and was trivial to figure out even just
looking at the encrypted sectors on the disk. It can be
argued, however, that since the entire contents of the
bootkit is code that will be decrypted before it can be
run, there is little point in hiding it from anything but
simple scans, as it could just be captured from memory
by analysts. To that end, the simple cipher serves its
purpose of not matching the signatures for executables
or of a boot sector while on disk.
Overall the level of detail that went into making this
malware was significant. It is capable of installing itself
on any Windows version, 32 or 64-bit, dating back to
Windows 2000, with the exception of newer installs
using UEFI. The lack of UEFI support is unlikely to be
an issue when targeting server systems, however,
especially with virtualization on the rise, as very few
virtual environments are virtualizing UEFI in their
guests. The small touches, such as anticipating that the
drive may have been repartitioned, show particular
thought and foresight (or testing) by the authors. Clearly
significant thought and work went into the creation of
this bootkit, and it is a mistake to dismiss it as amateur.
While different versions of the dropper are geared
toward different targets (the observed sample here
targets the Schedule service on 64-bit systems), the
overall framework is very flexible. The choices made
inside the dropper or when compiling the dropper are
able to be tuned toward the target, choosing a service
compatible with that version of Windows. This makes
narrowing down the traits of the bootkit from which
services it targets to be very difficult, as it is trivial for
the authors to change their target.
Overall, this exercise shows that the analysis done
by security companies would be more useful to the
security field if their results were published in enough
detail to be verifiable by outside sources. Most
companies guard the particulars of their research as
proprietary information, not sharing how their findings
were discovered. But security defenders rely on these
descriptions of attacks, not just file hash signatures, to
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look for, detect, and build behavioral signatures for
these newly discovered threats. It becomes ineffective
for them to do so when they are provided
misinformation and no resources to check these
conclusions in a timely manner. While public disclosure
of these threats is a great benefit to the security industry,
on the whole it would be better served if more
companies would publish in-depth and reproducible
results.
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